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We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-
owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm
searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence
and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’
classification as strong or weak according to the agent’s optimal reaction
function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role
(either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare
the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type
of Stackelberg equilibrium.
Keywords: mixed duopoly; Cournot equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium
AMS Subject Classifications: 91B52; 91B54; 91B60; 91B68
1. Introduction
Examinations of mixed oligopolies, in which social surplus-maximizing public firms
compete against profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in
recent years. For pioneering works on mixed oligopolies, see [1,2,4,11]. Excellent surveys
can be found in [3,12,14].
The interest in mixed oligopolies is high because of their importance in the economies
of Europe (Germany, England and others), Canada and Japan (see [10] for analysis of
‘herd behaviour’ by private firms in many branches of the economy in Japan). There are
examples of mixed oligopolies in United States such as the packaging and overnight
delivery industries. Mixed oligopolies are also common in the East European and former
Soviet Union transitional economies, in which competition among public and private
firms existed or still exists in many industries such as banking, house loan, airlines,
telecommunication, natural gas, electric power, hospital, health care, railways and
others.
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These situations have been investigated in different ways. Many works analysed
Cournot and Stackelberg models with the role of each firm assigned exogenously.
However, it is reasonable to assume that each firm decides what actions to take, and when
to take them.
DeFraja and Delbono [3] are pioneers in these investigations. They showed that in
simultaneous-move games, privatization of the public firm may improve welfare. In [9] it is
shown that under certain conditions, the partial privatization of the public firm improves
welfare. Pal [13] found that the public firm can be follower, but he assumed that private
firms are domestic.
In the paper by Matsumura [8], the author investigates mixed duopoly and analyses
a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, when the inverse demand
function is concave. Under these conditions, Matsumura found that the role of the public
firm should be that of the leader (however, the author makes assumptions about the
concavity of domestic social surplus and profit function with respect to the volumes of the
domestic public firm and private foreign firm, respectively). Matsumura also establishes
that domestic social surplus in a mixed duopoly is greater than in a monopolistic market.
In this article, we also examine the desirable roles of both the foreign private agent and
the domestic public firm. In contrast to [8], here we do not require the inverse demand
function to be concave. Hence the model describes more general situations, and the role of
firms in the observable delay game could be either leader or follower.
An extended abstract of this work was published in the Proceedings of the 2nd
International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control
(ICICIC’2007), Kumamoto, Japan, September 05–07, 2007 (cf [7]).
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model and
establish existence and uniqueness theorems for the Cournot equilibrium. After
analysing the agents’ optimal response functions at the Cournot equilibrium, we define
the concept of a strong firm and a weak firm. Section 3 deals with the game where the
domestic public firm is the leader and the private foreign firm is the follower. Section 4
considers the game where the domestic public firm is the follower and the private
foreign firm is the leader. The domestic public firm may have two different types of
optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium, and as a consequence this firm could be
weak or strong. Finally, in Section 5, we make comparisons between the domestic
social surplus quantities and the private firm’s profits at various Stackelberg and
Cournot equilibrium states, and we examine the observable delay game when the
private firm is strong and when it is weak.
Due to the volume restrictions, we omit certain lengthy proofs, which will appear
elsewhere.
2. Model specification
Consider two firms producing a homogeneous product. Let G represent the total output,
and p(G) denote an inverse demand function, i.e. the price of a unit of the product. The
goods produced by the two firms are sold on the domestic market. Let qi, i¼ 1,2, denote
the output of firm i. Let ci(qi) stand for the production cost by firm i. As G is the total
output, one has
G ¼ q1 þ q2: ð2:1Þ
690 V. Kalashnikov et al.
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Firm 1 is a foreign private firm, which maximizes its own profits, and firm 2 is a domestic
public firm that maximizes domestic social surplus. Domestic social surplus S is the sum of
consumer surplus and profits of firm 2, and is given by
SðG, q2Þ ¼
Z G
0
pðxÞdx ½pðGÞq1 þ c2ðq2Þ; ð2:2Þ
here of course, q1¼G q2.
The profit of firm 1 is given by:
P G, q1ð Þ ¼ pðGÞq1  c1ðq1Þ: ð2:3Þ
We also want to solve an observable delay game. This game consists of three stages. At the
first stage, each firm i, i¼ 1, 2 independently chooses ei2 {2, 3}, i¼ 1, 2, where ei indicates
when to produce the output qi. Namely, ei¼ 2 implies that firm i produces at the second
stage, and ei¼ 3 means that firm i produces at the third stage. In the end of the first stage,
each firm select its ei2 (2, 3). At the second stage, each firm i choosing ei¼ 2 assigns its
output qi. At the third stage, each firm i choosing ei¼ 3 selects its output qi. In the end of
the game, the market opens and each firm i sells its output. This is a complete information
game, i.e. each firm knows the rival’s choice at the first stage.
We accept the following assumptions concerning the inverse demand function and cost
functions:
A1. Let p(G) 0 be a twice continuously differentiable function defined over G4 0, with
p0ðGÞ5 0 and p(G)G being a strictly concave function. Moreover, we assume that
p0 Gð Þ  p00 Gð ÞG5 0 for G4 0: ð2:4Þ
A2. We assume that the cost functions ci(qi), i¼ 1, 2, are twice continuously
differentiable, non-decreasing and convex, with non-negative values defined over qi 0
(i.e. ci(qi) 0).
A3. For i¼ 1, there exists an H14 0, such that:
c01 H1ð Þ ¼ p H1ð Þ,
whereas for i¼ 2, there exists an H24 0, such that:
p H2ð Þ H1 1þH1
H2
 
p0 H2ð Þ ¼ c02 H2ð Þ:
A4. Principle of potential participation
For i¼ 1, there exist G04 0 and q014 0 such that G5G0 implies that for q15 q01 the
following (strict) inequality holds:
p Gð Þ þ p0 Gð ÞG c01 q1ð Þ4 0:
Remark 2.1 Assumptions A1 and A2 are quite natural and common for works analysing
equilibrium in the homogeneous good markets. Examples of functions that satisfy A1 are:
pðGÞ ¼ AG with A4 0 and 05 5 1, among others. Inequality (2.4) is evidently true if
the inverse demand function p(G) is convex and decreasing. However, it also allows the
Optimization 691
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function p(G) to be concave, but not ‘too concave’, that is, not with a ‘too negative’ second
derivative p00ðGÞ.
Remark 2.2 Assumption A3 is also common enough to avoid unlimited production
incentives for both agents. The principle of potential participation given in A4 excludes the
possibility of the trivial (zero) equilibrium.
Remark 2.3 Relationships p(G) 0 and p0ðGÞ5 0 for all G4 0 from assumption A1
imply that
lim
G!1
p0 Gð Þ ¼ 0: ð2:5Þ
Hence, the relationship
p H2ð Þ H1 1þH1
H2
 
p0 H2ð Þ ¼ c02 H2ð Þ
of assumption A3 yields that there exists an H34 0 such that
p Gð Þ H1 1þH1
H2
 
p0 Gð Þ  c02 q2ð Þ5 0 for all G  q24H3: ð2:6Þ
To make it possible to define an equilibrium with only first-order optimality conditions,
we first have to verify that the profit and/or domestic social surplus functions are concave
over their domains. We do that by establishing the following auxiliary results given
without proof that will appear elsewhere.
LEMMA 2.1 Under assumptions A1 and A2, firm 1’s profit functionP(G, q1) is concave with
respect to q1.
LEMMA 2.2 Under assumptions A1 and A2, the domestic social surplus function S(G, q2) is
concave with respect to q2.
Remark 2.4 It is easy to see that if one assumes the cost functions ci, i¼ 1, 2, to be strictly
convex, then both Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 guarantee the strict concavity of the respective
objective functions P and S.
Now we are in a position to define different kinds of equilibrium states and compare the
equilibrium volumes for various scenarios. First, we consider the classical Cournot
equilibrium, i.e. a vector Z¼ (G, q1, q2)2Rþ3, such that:
G ¼
X2
i¼1
qi, ð2:7Þ
q1  0, ’1  c01 q1ð Þ  q1p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ  0, q1’1 ¼ 0; ð2:8Þ
q2  0, ’2  c02 q2ð Þ þ G q2ð Þp0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ  0, q2’2 ¼ 0: ð2:9Þ
Problem (2.7)–(2.9) is a standard complementarity problem. Therefore, to establish the
existence of solutions to the latter, we can use powerful theoretical tools developed in the
book by Isac, Bulavsky and Kalashnikov [5].
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THEOREM 2.3 (Existence Theorem) Let assumptions A1–A4 be valid. Then the Cournot
equilibrium problem (2.7)–(2.9) has a (non-trivial) solution.
Proof The existence of solutions to problems (2.7)–(2.9) follows from the next result.
This Cournot equilibrium problem is a standard complementarity problem and can be
rewritten in the following form: Find a vector x2R2 such that:
x  0, F xð Þ  0 and xTF xð Þ ¼ 0; ð2:10Þ
here
x ¼ q1, q2ð ÞT, F1 xð Þ ¼  @
@q1
P G, q1ð Þ and F2 xð Þ ¼  @
@q2
S G, q2ð Þ: ð2:11Þ
As it follows from assumption A1, the mapping F :R2þ!R2 is continuous over the non-
negative quadrant R2þ. We may use the following theorem to establish the existence of
solutions.
THEOREM 6.8 [5] Consider a continuous mapping F :Rnþ!Rn and a non-empty bounded
subset CRnþ such that for every x2Rnþ and x =2C, the inequality
xiFiðxÞ4 0 ð2:12Þ
is valid for at least one of the indices i¼ 1, . . . , n. Then problem (2.10) has a solution, and all
the solutions belong to C.
Coming back to the proof of Theorem 2.3, select a (non-empty) subset
C ¼ x 2 R2 0  q1  H1, 0  q2  H3
 , ð2:13Þ
with H3 defined in Remark 2.3 (see inequality (2.6)). Now we prove that inequality (2.12)
holds for at least one index at any point x outside the subset C. Consider an arbitrary
x =2C, that is, at least one of the following conditions is valid:
(i) q14H1. In this case, according to assumptions A1–A4, we get the inequality
p Gð Þ  f01 q1ð Þ5 0 for all G  q14H1: ð2:14Þ
Now recall that
F1 xð Þ ¼ c01 q1ð Þ  q1p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ,
which, together with (2.14), immediately implies that F1(x)4 0, hence
x1F1 xð Þ ¼ q1F1 xð Þ4 0 for any q14H1: ð2:15Þ
Inequality (2.15) implies formula (2.12) in case (i).
(ii) Assume that 0 q1H1, but q24H3. In that case, by assumptions A1–A4, the
following inequality holds:
p Gð Þ H1 1þH1
H2
 
p0 Gð Þ  c01 q2ð Þ5 0 for G  q24H3: ð2:16Þ
Let us examine the component F2(x):
F2 xð Þ ¼ c01 q2ð Þ þ q1p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ; ð2:17Þ
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as 0 q1H1, q24H3, G¼ q1þ q2 and p0ðGÞ5 0, we deduce from (2.16) and (2.17) that:
F2 xð Þ ¼ c01 q2ð Þ þ q1p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ
 c01 q2ð Þ þH1p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ
 c01 q2ð Þ þH1 1þ
H1
H2
 
p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ4 0:
Thus, the last inequality implies x2F2(x)¼ q2F2(x)4 0, that is, (2.12) is valid for any x =2C
in case (ii), too. Therefore, to complete the proof of Theorem 2.3, it suffices to apply
Theorem 6.8. g
Now we turn to examining uniqueness properties of the Cournot equilibrium defined
by (2.7)–(2.9). First we engage in determining the uniqueness of a non-monopolistic
equilibrium volume. To do that, we need to involve an extra assumption concerning the
inverse demand function p.
Definition 2.1 Let Z¼ [G, q1, q2] be an equilibrium, i.e. a solution of the Cournot problem
(2.7)–(2.9). We say that this equilibrium is non-monopolistic if qi5G, i¼ 1, 2.
A5. Assume that the product p0ðGÞG is a non-decreasing function over G4 0.
Remark 2.5 Assumption A5 implies that the inverse demand function’s decrease rate is
not too high (in other words, the negative slope p0ðGÞ is ‘not too negative’). Moreover, it is
clear that assumption A5 is equivalent to the condition
p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð ÞG  0, for G4 0,
which, together with assumption A1, implies the convexity of the inverse demand
function p.
THEOREM 2.4 (Theorem of Uniqueness) Under assumptions A1, A2 and A5, the cleared
market quantity G is the same at each non-monopolistic equilibrium.
Remark 2.6 When the equilibrium is non-monopolistic, then according to Theorem 2.4,
the cleared market volume G is determined uniquely. However, in some cases both
monopolistic and non-monopolistic equilibrium states with distinct volumes can occur.
For instance, that may happen if the cost functions ci and the product p(G)G are piece-wise
linear functions.
We finish this section with a result guaranteeing the uniqueness of not only the
equilibrium cleared market volume G but also the complete equilibrium state
Z¼ (G, q1, q2).
COROLLARY 2.5 Under assumptions A1–A5, the equilibrium state Z exists uniquely.
Proof First, under assumptions A1–A4, there are equilibrium states. Moreover, as
assumption A4 implies, no agent can have zero production volume, hence all the
equilibrium states are non-monopolistic. Therefore, Theorem 2.4 implies that the
equilibrium cleared market volume G is unique. Now suppose that for the same volume
G, there exist two distinct pairs ½qð1Þ1 , qð1Þ2  and ½qð2Þ1 , qð2Þ2  satisfying the balance equality
G ¼
X2
i¼1
q
ð1Þ
i ¼
X2
i¼1
q
ð2Þ
i , ð2:18Þ
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and the respective pair of complementarity relationships (2.8) and (2.9). Without affecting
generality assume that
05 qð1Þ1 5 q
ð2Þ
1 : ð2:19Þ
Hence, assumption A2 implies that
c01

q
ð1Þ
1
  c01qð2Þ1 : ð2:20Þ
Moreover, as it follows from (2.8), ’1ðqð1Þ1 Þ ¼ ’1ðqð2Þ1 Þ ¼ 0 (because both
q
ð1Þ
1 4 0 and q
ð2Þ
1 4 0), and making use of (2.19), (2.20) and the negativity of p
0ðGÞ,
one has the following chain of relationships:
0 ¼ ’1

q
ð2Þ
1
  p Gð Þ þ qð2Þ1 p0 Gð Þ  c01qð2Þ1 
5 p Gð Þ þ qð1Þ1 p0 Gð Þ  c01

q
ð1Þ
1
  ’1qð1Þ1  ¼ 0,
which implies an impossible inequality 05 0. This contradiction completes the proof of
the uniqueness of the equilibrium contribution by the foreign agent q1. Finally, the balance
equality (2.18) guarantees the uniqueness of the domestic firm’s equilibrium production
volume q2 as well. g
3. Stackelberg model with leadership of domestic (public) firm
First, in this section, we examine the game where firm 2 (the public one) is the leader. Firm
2 chooses its output volume q2, and firm 1 (the private one) chooses q1 after having
observed q2, so as to maximize its net profit:
P G, q1ð Þ ¼ p Gð Þq1  c1 q1ð Þ: ð3:1Þ
Let q1¼ q1(q2) 0 be the (optimal) reaction function of firm 1; that is, the value that
satisfies the equality
’1 q1 q2ð Þð Þ  @
@q1
P G, q1 q2ð Þð Þ  0 and ’1 q1 q2ð Þð Þ  q1 q2ð Þ ¼ 0: ð3:2Þ
By convexity of the cost function c1 and by assumption A3, this reaction function is well
defined. Indeed, if pðGÞ4 c01ð0Þ then one can obtain q1(q2) by solving the first-order
optimality condition:
@P G, q1ð Þ
@q1
¼ p Gð Þ þ p0 Gð Þq1  c01 q1ð Þ ¼ 0; ð3:3Þ
otherwise, i.e. if pðGÞ  c01ð0Þ, then q1(q2)¼ 0. In other words,
q1 q2ð Þ ¼ 0 for all q2  ~q2 ¼ p1 f 01 0ð Þ
	 

: ð3:4Þ
Remark 3.1 Notice that the value ~q24 0 defined by (3.4) exists uniquely due to
assumptions A1–A4, if c01ð0Þ4 0. Otherwise, i.e. if c01ð0Þ ¼ 0, then ~q2 ¼ þ1, or in other
words, q1(q2)4 0 for all q24 0.
Optimization 695
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On the one hand, if the value ~q24 0 is finite, then
q01 q2ð Þ ¼ 0 for all q24 ~q2 and q01 ~q2 þ 0ð Þ ¼ 0: ð3:5Þ
On the other hand, when q25 ~q2 then the derivative q01ðq2Þ can be found making use of the
second-order equation obtained by differentiating the left-hand side of Equation (3.3) with
respect to q2:
p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1 q2ð Þ þ 2p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1 q2ð Þ  c001 q1ð Þ
	 

q01 Gð Þ ¼ 0,
whence
q01 q2ð Þ ¼
p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1
c001 q1ð Þ  2p0 Gð Þ  p00 Gð Þq1
: ð3:6Þ
The denominator in (3.6) is always positive: indeed, c001(q1) 0 by assumption A2, and
2p0ðGÞ þ p00ðGÞG5 0 by the strict concavity of the function p(G)G (A1). Now if p00(G) 0,
then 2p0ðGÞ þ p00ðGÞq15 0, hence the denominator in (3.6) is strictly positive. Finally, if
p00(G)4 0, then one has the chain of inequalities
2p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1  2p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð ÞG5 0,
which again yields the strict positivity of the denominator in (3.6). Therefore, (3.6) implies
q01 q2ð Þ
0 if p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1  0;
40 otherwise:

ð3:7Þ
Now we introduce the following classification of agents, according to their optimal
reaction function’s properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Such a classification was
considered first in [6] and can be also found in the book by Isac, Bulavsky and
Kalashnikov [5]. To do that, we denote the (unique) solution of the Cournot game
(2.7)–(2.9) total volume by GC.
Definition 3.1 A firm is called strong if the derivate of its reaction function is non-
negative at the Cournot equilibrium cleared market volume GC, that is, if q0iðGC  qiÞ  0.
Respectively, a firm is called weak if its reaction function’s derivative is negative at the
Cournot equilibrium, that is, if q0iðGC  qiÞ5 0.
Remark 3.2 Definition 3.1 is based upon the potential reaction of firm i when the latter
assumes that the rival firm j increases its output. If the reaction of firm i is not to decrease
its output, firm i is a strong firm. But if firm i decreases its output, firm i is a weak firm.
For example, (3.7) implies that, under assumptions A1–A4, if the inverse demand function
p is concave then the private firm is always weak.
Now we realize a comparative analysis for various strategies of the firms. We are going to
compare the volume of the Cournot equilibrium GC with those of Stackelberg equilibrium
states when the domestic public firm is the leader GF,L, and when the private firm is the
leader GL,F. Also, we compare domestic social surplus and the profits of the private firm at
these various equilibrium states.
LEMMA 3.1 Under assumptions A1–A4,
q01 q2ð Þ4 1 for all q2 6¼ ~q2: ð3:8Þ
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Moreover, if the value ~q24 0 is finite then q01ð ~q2  0Þ5 0 and q01ð ~q2 þ 0Þ ¼ 0.
Proof Rewrite (3.6) as follows:
q01 q2ð Þ ¼
p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1
c001 q1ð Þ  p0 Gð Þ  p0 Gð Þ þ p00 Gð Þq1½ 
: ð3:9Þ
Now if q01ðq2Þ  0, then (3.8) trivially holds. Otherwise, if q01ðq2Þ5 0, i.e. if
p0ðGÞ þ p00ðGÞq15 0, then (3.9) clearly implies (3.8) due to the inequality
c001 q1ð Þ  p0 Gð Þ4 0: ð3:10Þ
Finally, as q1ðq2Þ ¼ 0 for q2  ~q2, one evidently has
q01 ~q2  0ð Þ ¼
p0 ~q2ð Þ
c001 0ð Þ  2p0 ~q2ð Þ
5 0 and q01 ~q2 þ 0ð Þ ¼ 0, ð3:11Þ
which, together with relationship (3.8), completes the proof. g
Now firm 2 (domestic producer) chooses q2Q 0 so as to maximize
S2 Qð Þ  S G Qð Þ,Qð Þ ¼
Z G Qð Þ
0
p qð Þdq p G Qð Þð Þq1 Qð Þ  c2 Qð Þ, ð3:12Þ
where
G Qð Þ ¼ q1 Qð Þ þQ: ð3:13Þ
First, we examine some basic properties of the domestic social surplus function S2(Q).
Definition (3.13) implies that if the value ~q24 0 is finite, then
G Qð Þ  Q if Q  ~q2;¼ Q if Q4 ~q2:

ð3:14Þ
Hence, the function G¼G(Q) is differentiable at every point Q 6¼ ~q2, with
G0 Qð Þ ¼ q01 Qð Þ þ 1, when Q 6¼ ~q2: ð3:15Þ
Lemma 3.1 guarantees that
G0 Qð Þ4 0, for all Q 6¼ ~q2: ð3:16Þ
At the point Q ¼ ~q2, the function G(Q) may have only one-side derivatives:
05G0 ~q2  0ð Þ ¼ q01 ~q2  0ð Þ þ 15 1,
G0 ~q2 þ 0ð Þ ¼ q01 ~q2 þ 0ð Þ þ 1 ¼ 1:
ð3:17Þ
Furthermore, since q01ðQÞ ¼ 0 for Q4 ~q2, (3.17) implies that
G0 Qð Þ ¼ 1 for all Q4 ~q2: ð3:18Þ
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Now differentiating the domestic social surplus function (3.12) with respect to Q and using
the relationship (3.15), one gets for Q 6¼ ~q2
S02 Qð Þ 
d
dQ
S G Qð Þ,Qð Þ ¼ p G Qð Þð ÞG0 Qð Þ  p0 G Qð Þð ÞG0 Qð Þq1 Qð Þ
 p G Qð Þð Þq01 Qð Þ  c02 Qð Þ
¼ p G Qð Þð Þ G0 Qð Þ  q01 Qð Þ
	 
 p0 G Qð Þð ÞG0 Qð Þq1 Qð Þ  c02 Qð Þ
¼ p G Qð Þð Þ  p0 G Qð Þð ÞG0 Qð Þq1 Qð Þ  c02 Qð Þ:
ð3:19Þ
In a similar manner we obtain the formulas for the one-side derivatives of the domestic
social surplus at the point Q ¼ ~q2 when it is finite:
S02 ~q2 	 0ð Þ ¼ p ~q2ð Þ  c02 ~q2ð Þ: ð3:20Þ
As the one-side derivatives are equal, we can conclude that domestic social surplus is
differentiable at the point Q ¼ ~q2 as well, with
S02 ~q2ð Þ ¼ p ~q2ð Þ  c02 ~q2ð Þ: ð3:21Þ
Now we are in a position to recall a mathematically rigorous definition of the Stackelberg
equilibrium state with the domestic leader and foreign follower.
Definition 3.2 A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the domestic firm as a leader and the
foreign firm as a follower) is the vector Z ¼ ðGF,L, qF1 ðQLÞ,QLÞ 2 R3þ such that
GF,L ¼ qF1 QL
 þQL, ð3:22Þ
QL 2 Argmax S1 Qð Þ
Q  0 , ð3:23Þ
qF1 Q
L
  ¼ argmax P GF,L, q1 q1  0 : ð3:24Þ
Next we establish relationships to compare the production volumes of the firms at the
Stackelberg equilibrium state (3.22)–(3.24) to those at the Cournot equilibrium defined by
the complementarity problem (2.7)–(2.9). Besides, it is interesting to compare the values
QC and QL to the domestic firm’s optimum output volume QPat the perfect competition
equilibrium, that is, when the domestic producer ignores the price variation and solves the
following complementarity problem: Find a Q 0 such that
2 Qð Þ  c02 Qð Þ  p G Qð Þð Þ  0 and 2 Qð ÞQ ¼ 0: ð3:25Þ
The proof is omitted due to the paper volume restrictions.
THEOREM 3.2 Under assumptions A1–A4, the following estimates hold:
05QP  min QC,QL,H3
 
; ð3:26Þ
here H3 is the parameter from Remark 2.3.
Remark 3.3 When the value ~q24 0 is finite, it is easy to see that if
c02 ~q2ð Þ  p ~q2ð Þ ¼ c01 0ð Þ, ð3:27Þ
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then
S02 Qð Þ ¼ p Qð Þ  c02 Qð Þ5 0 for all Q4 ~q2, ð3:28Þ
which means that
QL  ~q2: ð3:29Þ
Relationships (3.27)–(3.29) also imply that
QC  ~q2: ð3:30Þ
Therefore, due to A3, one can deduce that
max QC,QL
   max ~q2,H2 : ð3:31Þ
Inequality (3.30) allows one to conclude that if ~q2  H2 then (3.26) may be rewritten as
follows:
05QP  min QC,QL   max QC,QL   H2 H3ð Þ: ð3:32Þ
Note that the estimates obtained in Theorem 2.2 and Remark 3.3 involve the
expressions minfQC,QLg and maxfQC,QLg, because assumptions A1–A4 in general
do not imply the (strict) concavity of the leader’s (domestic social surplus) function
S2(Q) over all Q 0. Now we introduce an additional assumption which allows
one to establish this concavity of the domestic social surplus function and hence
deduce more exact global comparative static results making use of some local
information only.
A6. Assume that the foreign firm’s cost function is linear:
c1 q1ð Þ ¼ c1q1, for all q1  0, ð3:33Þ
where c14 0 is a constant, and the inverse demand function has the following property:
the ratio
p00 Gð Þ
p0 Gð Þ
is a differentiable function of G4 0, and the following estimate holds:
d
dG
p00 Gð Þ
p0 Gð Þ
 
  1
G
 p
00 Gð Þ
p0 Gð Þ : ð3:34Þ
Remark 3.4 Examples of functions that satisfy (3.34) are: pðGÞ ¼ AG with A4 0 and
05   1, among others.
THEOREM 3.3 Under assumptions A1–A4 and A6, and with the leadership of the domestic
supplier, the domestic social surplus function S2(Q) is strictly concave over Q 0.
Being too long, we omit the proof of the above result, to be published elsewhere. Now we
can obtain the complete comparative static classification for the Cournot and Stackelberg
equilibrium states under assumptions A1–A4 and A6.
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THEOREM 3.4 Under assumptions A1–A4 and A6, and with the leadership of the domestic
supplier, the following global estimates based upon the local information are true:
(i) If G0ðQC  0Þ  1 and G0ðQC þ 0Þ ¼ 1, then QL¼QC, hence G(QL)¼G(QC). This
case can occur only at the point QL ¼ QC ¼ ~q2.
(ii) If G0ðQC  0Þ4 1, then QL4QC, hence G(QL)4G(QC).
(iii) If G0ðQC þ 0Þ5 1, then QL5QC, hence G(QL)5G(QC).
Proof Due to relationships (3.5), (3.11) and (3.15), case (i) indeed may happen only at the
point Q ¼ ~q2 with q1 ¼ q1ð ~q2Þ ¼ 0. Then formulas (2.9), (3.19)–(3.21) give us S02ð ~q2Þ ¼ 0,
which implies (due to the strict concavity of the function S2 obtained in Theorem 3.3) that
QL ¼ ~q2. On the other hand, it is easy to see that in this case, Z ¼ ð ~q2, 0, ~q2Þ satisfies
conditions (2.7)–(2.9), thus yielding that QC ¼ ~q2.
In case (ii), which corresponds to a strong foreign firm with q01ðQCÞ4 0, formula (3.19)
yields S02ðQCÞ4 0, hence by Theorem 2.3 we deduce that the maximum domestic surplus
occurs beyond the Cournot volume, i.e.
QL4QC, hence G QL
 
4G QC
 
: ð3:35Þ
At last, case (iii) reflecting the weakness of the foreign participant with q01ðQCÞ5 0 implies
by (3.19) that S02ðQCÞ5 0. Again Theorem 2.3 makes it possible to conclude that the
domestic leader’s optimum production volume with S02ðQLÞ ¼ 0 must be lower than the
Cournot volume, that is,
QL5QC, hence G QL
 
5G QC
 
: ð3:36Þ
The theorem has been proved completely. g
Remark 3.5 Case (i) in Theorem 3.4 occurs if and only if
S02 ~q2ð Þ ¼ 0, i:e: p ~q2ð Þ ¼ c02 ~q2ð Þ: ð3:37Þ
However, since ~q2 ¼ p1½c01ð0Þ ¼ p1ðc1Þ, (3.37) means that
c01ð0Þ ¼ c1 ¼ c02 ~q2ð Þ: ð3:38Þ
Hence, under assumptions A1–A4 and A6, equality (3.38) can be solved for the parameter
value ~q2 as follows:
~q2 ¼ p1 c1ð Þ ¼ c02
 1
c1ð Þ: ð3:39Þ
Remark 3.6 Cases (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 3.4 allow the following interpretation.
Although the total domestic surplus is always higher if the domestic producer is a leader,
because
S2 Q
L
   S2 QC  ð3:40Þ
by definitions (3.22)–(3.24), it is interesting to note that the total market cleared volume in
the Stackelberg scenario grows compared to that in the Cournot equilibrium only if the
foreign producer is a strong firm. Indeed, case (ii) with G0ðQCÞ4 1 means that
q01 Q
C
 
4 0:
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On the contrary, if q01ðQCÞ5 0, that is, when the foreign participant is weak, one comes to
case (iii), with QL5QC, hence G(QL)5G(QC) and thus
p G QL
  
4 p G QC
  
:
Therefore, for an individual consumer concerned with the good’s retail price, it would be
better if the domestic producer as a leader of the market were accompanied by a strong
foreign competitor as a follower.
4. Stackelberg model with leadership of foreign (private) firm
Now consider the game where firm 1 (foreign private firm) is a leader. Firm 1 chooses q1
and firm 2 (domestic or public supplier) chooses q2 after having observed q1, so as to
maximize domestic social surplus:
S G, q2ð Þ ¼
Z G
0
p qð Þdq q1p Gð Þ  c2 q2ð Þ; ð4:1Þ
here
G ¼ q1 þ q2: ð4:2Þ
Let q2(q1) be the reaction function of firm 2; that is, the quantity that satisfies the
optimality condition below:
q2 q1ð Þ ¼ argmax
q20,G¼q1þq2
S G, q2ð Þ: ð4:3Þ
This reaction function is well defined due to convexity of the cost function c2 and
assumption A3. Moreover, assumptions A2 and A4 imply that if q1¼ 0 then the reaction
value of firm 2 solving the equation
p q2ð Þ ¼ c02 q2ð Þ ð4:4Þ
is always positive but not exceeding the upper bound H2 from assumption A3. Otherwise,
if q14 0, then the reaction value of firm 2 solves the complementarity problem (2.9):
q2  0, ’2  c02 q2ð Þ þ q1p0 Gð Þ  p Gð Þ  0, q2’2 ¼ 0; ð4:5Þ
and again, it is strictly positive and not exceedingH2. This means that q2¼ q2(q1)4 0 is the
unique solution of the equation
p Gð Þ  q1p0 Gð Þ  c02 q2ð Þ ¼ 0: ð4:6Þ
Now taking into account (4.2) and differentiating the obtained equation with respect to q1
one gets:
p0 Gð Þ 1þ q02 q1ð Þ
	 
 p0 Gð Þ  q1p00 Gð Þ 1þ q02 q1ð Þ	 
 c002 q2 q1ð Þð Þq02 q1ð Þ ¼ 0,
whence
q02 q1ð Þ ¼
q1p
00 Gð Þ
p0 Gð Þ  q1p00 Gð Þ  c002 q2 q1ð Þð Þ
: ð4:7Þ
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The denominator in ratio (4.7) is always negative. Indeed, c002(q2(q1)) 0 due to
assumption A2; next, if p00(G) 0, then p0ðGÞ  q1p00ðGÞ5 0 by assumption A1 as
p0ðGÞ5 0; finally, if p00(G)5 0, one yields the chain of inequalities
p0 Gð Þ  q1p00 Gð Þ  p0 Gð Þ  p00 Gð ÞG5 0
by (2.4) in assumption A1. Therefore, we conclude that
q02 q1ð Þ
 0 if p00 Gð Þ  0;
4 0 if p00 Gð Þ5 0;

for all G4 0: ð4:8Þ
Remark 4.1 Formula (4.8) has an interesting economic interpretation: the domestic
producer (firm 2) is always weak if the inverse demand function is convex, and is always
strong if the latter is concave.
Now firm 1 (foreign producer) selects a q1Q 0 so as to maximize its profit function
P1 Qð Þ  P G Qð Þ,Qð Þ ¼ p G Qð Þð ÞQ c1 Qð Þ, ð4:9Þ
where
G Qð Þ ¼ Qþ q2 Qð Þ: ð4:10Þ
By differentiating (4.10) with respect to Q one gets
G0 Qð Þ ¼ 1þ q02 Qð Þ: ð4:11Þ
Now differentiating the foreign firm’s profit (4.9) by Q one yields
P01 Qð Þ ¼ p G Qð Þð Þ þ p0 G Qð Þð ÞG0 Qð ÞQ c01 Qð Þ: ð4:12Þ
Definition 4.1 A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the foreign firm as a leader and the
domestic firm as a follower) is the vector Z ¼ ðGL,F,QL1 , qF2 ðQL1 ÞÞ 2 R3þ such that
GL,F ¼ QL1 þ qF2 QL1
 
, ð4:13Þ
QL1 2 Argmax P1 Q1ð Þ
Q1  0 , ð4:14Þ
qF2 Q
L
  ¼ argmax S GL,F, q2 q2  0 : ð4:15Þ
In what follows we establish relationships which allow one to compare the production
volumes of the cleared market at the Stackelberg equilibrium (4.13)–(4.15) to those at
the Cournot equilibrium defined with the complementarity problem (2.7)–(2.9). Besides,
it is instructive to compare the values QC1 and Q
L
1 to the foreign firm’s optimum output
QP1 in the perfect competition equilibrium, that is, when the foreign (private) producer
ignores variations in price and solves the following complementarity problem: Find
a Q1 0 such that
1 Q1ð Þ  c01 Q1ð Þ  p G Q1ð Þð Þ  0 and 1 Q1ð ÞQ1 ¼ 0: ð4:16Þ
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Remark 4.2 It is easy to see that the solution QP1 of problem (4.16) always exists and does
not exceed the parameter value H1 from assumption A3. Assumption A4 also guarantees
that QP1 has a positive value:
05QP1  H1: ð4:17Þ
First of all, we note that QL1 solves the following complementarity problem: Find a Q1 0
such that
1 Q1ð Þ  c01 Q1ð Þ  p0 G Q1ð Þð ÞG0 Q1ð ÞQ1  p G Q1ð Þð Þ  0 and 1 Q1ð ÞQ1 ¼ 0, ð4:18Þ
with
G Q1ð Þ ¼ Q1 þ q2 Q1ð Þ, ð4:19Þ
while QC1 is a solution to the complementarity problem (2.8): Find a Q1 0 such that
’1 Q1ð Þ  c01 Q1ð Þ  p0 G Q1ð Þð ÞQ1  p G Q1ð Þð Þ  0, and ’1 Q1ð ÞQ1 ¼ 0, ð4:20Þ
where
G Q1ð Þ ¼ Q1 þ qC2 ¼ Q1 þQC: ð4:21Þ
Finally, recall that QF1 solves the following complementarity problem: Find a Q1 0 such
that
1 Q1ð Þ  c01 Q1ð Þ  p0 G Q1ð Þð ÞQ1  p G Q1ð Þð Þ  0 and 1 Q1ð ÞQ1 ¼ 0, ð4:22Þ
with
G Q1ð Þ ¼ Q1 þQL2 : ð4:23Þ
THEOREM 4.1 Under assumptions A1–A4, with a strictly convex cost function c1 and
a convex inverse demand function p, the following relationships are valid:
0  QC1  QL1  QP1  H1: ð4:24Þ
Otherwise, if the function p is concave, we have the inequalities below:
0  QL1  QC1  QP1  H1: ð4:25Þ
As the proof of the above theorem is quite lengthy, we omit it to publish later
elsewhere.
Remark 4.3 If we assume that G0ðQ1Þ4 0 (which, e.g., is guaranteed if p is concave, cf
(4.8) and (4.11), but not only in this case) we can make interesting conclusions concerning
the cleared market volume in different scenarios. On the one hand, when p00  0,
inequalities (4.24) imply the relationships
GC ¼ G QC1
   G QL1  ¼ GL,F  G QP1 : ð4:26Þ
These relationships mean that when the domestic producer is weak, the leadership of the
private firm is better for the individual consumer than the Cournot competition between
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the private and public producers, as the former may result in a lower retail price of the
good on the market.
On the other hand, if the inverse demand function is concave, i.e. p00  0, then
inequalities (4.25), together with G0ðQ1Þ4 0, yield
GL,F ¼ G QL1
   G QC1  ¼ GC  G QP1 ,
which clearly indicate that if the domestic producer is strong, then the leadership of the
private firm may lower the total market volume against the Cournot equilibrium and
hence raise the good’s retail price on the market.
5. Solution of observable delay game
Now denote the domestic social surplus optimal values and the foreign firm’s profits at the
various forms of equilibrium as follows:
SL  S2 QL2
 
, SC  S GC, qC2
 
and SF  S GL,F, qF2;
 
PL  P1 QL1
 
, PC  P GC, qC1
 
and PF  P GF,L, qF1
 
:
ð5:1Þ
To find possible equilibrium states in the observable delay game described in the
beginning of Section 2, we need to compare the values SL, SCand SF, and the values PL,
PC and PF as defined in (5.1). Due to the definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium, it is
clear that
SL  SC and PL  PC: ð5:2Þ
As to the comparison between values of SC and SF, we establish the following result
(the proof will be presented elsewhere).
LEMMA 5.1 Under assumptions A1–A4, and with p convex, one has the inequality
SF  SC: ð5:3Þ
On the other hand, if p is concave, we come to the inequality
SF  SC: ð5:4Þ
The next result compares the values of PC and PF. Again, the proof is omitted due to the
volume restrictions.
LEMMA 5.2 Under assumptions A1–A4 and A6, the following relationships are true:
(i) If G0ðQC2  0Þ  1 and G0ðQC2 þ 0Þ ¼ 1, then PF¼PC. This case can occur only
when QL2 ¼ QC2 ¼ ~G1.
(ii) If G0ðQC2  0Þ4 1, then PF5PC.
(iii) If G0ðQC2 þ 0Þ5 1, then PF4PC.
Now summing up the results obtained in Theorems 3.4 and 4.1, and Lemmas 5.1
and 5.2, we may analyse all possible equilibrium states in the observable delay game
cited in the beginning of the article. Proof of the following theorem will be published
elsewhere.
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THEOREM 5.3 Under assumptions A1–A4 and A6, and with a convex inverse demand
function p (and hence with a weak public firm), the following results hold:
(i) If G0ðQC2  0Þ4 1, then there is only one Nash equilibrium in the observable delay
game: e*¼ (2, 3), which means that the (strong) private firm is a leader and the
public firm is a follower.
(ii) Otherwise, if G0ðQC2 þ 0Þ5 1, then there are two Nash equilibria in the observable
delay game: the same e
1 ¼ ð2, 3Þ as in case (i), and the second one e
2 ¼ ð3, 2Þ; the
latter meaning that the public firm is a leader and the private firm is a follower.
On the other hand, if the inverse demand function p is concave, and hence we have a strong
public firm and a weak private firm, only one case is possible:
(iii) As G0ðQC2 þ 0Þ5 1, then there is only one Nash equilibrium in the observable delay
game: e*¼ (3, 2), which means that the public firm is a leader and the private firm is
a follower.
6. Conclusion
In the presented analysis, we investigated three different types of equilibria in the duopoly
with a private (foreign) agent aiming at maximization of its own profit, and a domestic
firm maximizing domestic social surplus. After having obtained the existence and
uniqueness results for the Cournot equilibrium in the above-described model, we examined
two versions of Stackelberg game, with the private firm as a leader and domestic one as
a follower, and vice versa.
In order to compare the equilibrium volumes in various scenarios we introduce the
concepts of a weak and a strong firm, in dependence on the sign of the agent’s optimal
reaction function’s derivative at the Cournot equilibrium. With such a characteristic, it
turns out that if the inverse demand function is convex, then the domestic producer is
always weak, and vice versa: if the inverse demand function is concave, then the domestic
agent is always strong.
For the Stackelberg equilibrium with the domestic producer as a leader, we obtain that
the production volume by the leader (and hence, the total cleared market volume) is higher
than that in the Cournot equilibrium, if the private firm (the follower) is strong. Otherwise,
if the private agent is weak, then the total cleared market volume is lower with the
domestic producer as a leader than that would be in the Cournot equilibrium.
Next, if the foreign (private) firm is a leader, then the relations between the leader’s
(and hence, the total) production volumes directly depend upon the strength of the
domestic producer as a follower: if the domestic producer is weak, then the leader’s
production volume is higher than that would be in the Cournot equilibrium; otherwise,
when the domestic firm is strong, the private leader’s output (and hence the total cleared
market volume) is lower than that in the Cournot equilibrium.
Comparing the corresponding values of the agents’ objective functions (the profit
function for the private firm, and domestic social surplus for the public firm), we find that
in the observable delay game with the two participants, the number of Nash equilibrium
states depends upon their relative efficiency. Namely, if the private firm is strong and the
domestic producer is weak, then only one Nash equilibrium exists in the observable delay
game, and that is the Stackelberg equilibrium with the private firm as a leader. Next, if
both the foreign (private) and the domestic (public) agents are weak, then two
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Nash equilibrium states occur: one is the same as just mentioned, and another one with the
roles interchanged: the domestic agent being a leader and the foreign firm being a follower.
Finally, when the domestic producer is strong and the foreign one is weak, again only one
Nash equilibrium in the observable delay game exists, and it is the Stackelberg equilibrium
with the domestic (public) producer as a leader and the foreign (private) firm as a follower.
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